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FOREIGN TRADE 
On the Case for Graduation 
by K. A. Koekkoek, Rotterdam* 
The goal of phasing out, and ultimately eliminating, the differential treatment in trade presently accorded to 
developing countries was incorporated into the GATT during the Tokyo Round, What are the arguments in 
favour of this process of "graduation" and what would be its disadvantages? Which criteria should be 
applied to the selection of countries for graduation? 
O~f  of the most important results of the Tokyo Round 
multilateral trade negotiations for developing 
countries was the introduction of the Enabling Clause. 
The Enabling Clause resulted as part of the negotiations 
in the so-called Framework Group, which had the 
explicit task of considering "improvements in the 
international framework for the conduct of world trade 
which might be desirable in the light of progress in the 
negotiations". 1 The Enabling Clause represents a 
trade-off between developing countries' wishes to 
institutionalize preferential treatment for their exports, 
on the one hand, and the industrial countries' wish for 
developing countries to participate in international trade 
on an equal basis with them, on the other. Therefore this 
clause provides the legal framework for preferential 
treatment of developing countries' exports both to 
industrialized countries and among themselves. As the 
price to be paid for this, the Enabling Clause also "states 
the expectation of developing countries that they will be 
ableto participate more fully in the framework of rights 
and obligations under the GATT with the progressive 
development of their economies and improvement of 
their trade situation" 2 
One of the reasons that not many developing 
countries have signed the Tokyo Round Agreements as 
yet is their dissatisfaction with this latter part of the 
Enabling Clause. Although the wording is rathervague 
and there is no time element involved, it is clearly to be 
understood as a first step towards abolishing 
preferential treatment at some time in the future. This 
future proved to be even nearer than the developing 
countries may have perceived at the time, for in the 
preparations for the GATT ministerial meeting in the 
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autumn of 1982 several developed countries stated, 
sometimes in a rather forceful way, that the graduation 
of developing countries should be a major topic on tile 
agenda. "Graduation" means that the preferential 
treatment of developing countries in their international 
trade relations is to be progressively phased out. 
Graduation in the context of GATT is only one aspect of 
graduation in general which, it must be emphasized, is 
not a new phenomenon. It has always been with us, in 
various forms. The following examples may clarify this. 3 
Graduation in Practice 
In so far as access to lending facilities of the World 
Bank is determined by the per capita income of the 
prospective borrowing country, there is a clear case of 
graduation. With regard to the IMF, there are member 
countries subject to article VIII and member countries 
subject to article XIV. The main difference between 
these two groups of countries is that those subject to 
article XIV may engage in discriminatory currency 
practices, while article VIII countries need the IMF's 
permission to do that. Graduation from article XIV to 
article VIII status is solely the responsibility of the 
country concerned. 
A third example may be found in the working of the 
Stabex facility of the EC. Stabex is a part of the Lome 
Convention. It is meant to stabilize the export earnings 
of the developing countries associated with the EC. To 
that effect, these countries get loans when commodity 
1 GATT: The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Geneva, 
April 1979, p. 9. 
z GATT, op. cit., p. 149. 
3 Foran extensive treatment, see I. F r a n k : The "Graduation" Issue 
for LDCs, in: Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1979, pp. 289- 
302. 
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export proceeds are below a certain trend value. These 
loans have to be paid back upon an advantageous price 
and volume development of these exports. Graduation 
comes into this scheme because the least developed 
among the associated countries have easier access to 
the compensation and are not required to pay back 
anything. 
Finally, within existing, generalized systems of 
preferences another type of graduation exists, which 
may be called productwise graduation. This means that 
when a developing country is successful enough in 
exporting a certain product, that product does not qualify 
for preferential treatment any more. In the case of the 
EC preferential scheme, success is measured 
according to the fulfilment of the preferential quota, 
beyond which treatment is reinstated. In the case of the 
US scheme, a developing country will lose its 
preferential treatment for the next year for any product 
for which it accounts for more than 50 % of total US 
imports of that product, or for any product, imports of 
which into the United States exceed a specified dollar 
ceiling ($ 25 million in 1974 and annually adjusted to 
reflect the growth of US GNP). 
It is thus clear that several types of graduation do 
exist, albeit mostly outside the field of trade relations. 
Any discussion about graduation within this field should 
thus be concerned not so much with the principle, for 
which a good case exists logically and historically. More 
interesting are the reasons behind the surfacing of the 
matter right now, the particulars of application to the field 
of trade relations and the criteria to be used in 
implementing this type of graduation. 
Why Graduation in Trade Relations? 
Let us first establish what graduation in the field of 
trade relations would imply. At its most extreme, it would 
amount to complete equalization of rights and duties, 
with regard to trade policy measures, between rich and 
graduating poor countries. This would involve not only 
abolishment of preferential systems for those LDCs, but 
also full application of the various codes of conduct 
agreed upon in the Tokyo Round. These codes of 
conduct deal, among other things, with export 
subsidies, customs valuation, government procurement 
and technical barriers to trade. Furthermore, these 
couhtries would have to adhere to the principle of 
reciprocity, i.e. they would have to open up their markets 
in exchange for easier access to other economies' 
markets. 
There is probably one main reason for the timing of 
the present demands for graduation, namely the 
slowdown of the rich countries' economies. This 
slowdown, and accompanying aspects such as low 
competitiveness, employment losses and so on, are 
often at least partly ascribed to the success of a number 
of developing countries in the sphere of industrial 
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exports. 4 This success is partly reflected in the 
performance of the developing countries in the 
preferential systems. More generally, the phenomenon 
of the newly industrializing countries shows that at least 
a number of developing countries enjoyed a very good 
industrial export performance in the seventies. 
The Role of Preferential Systems 
Generalised systems of preferences have been 
established because of the dissatisfaction of the LDCs 
with the working of the GATT system. Very generally, 
their reasoning can be described in the following way. 
LDCs could not really profit from the GATT system 
because they were not capable of offering tariff 
concessions and so they did not get any concessions in 
return. They also did not benefit from the tariff 
decreases offered by rich countries amongst 
themselves as these countries mostly traded 
concessions of typical DC-products. As one cannot 
profit from a tariff concession if one does not export the 
product concerned, the LDCs thus did not benefit from 
the mfn clause either. 
So already at UNCTAD I, in 1964, the LDCs insisted 
upon preferential treatment for their exports, later 
typified by the slogan "unequal treatment for unequal 
partners". The purpose of preferential treatment was to 
promote industrial exports, economic growth and 
development of LDCs in general. This promotion was to 
take place via positive discrimination of LDCs' industrial 
exports, i.e. preferential access to industrial countries' 
markets. Tariff concessions were to be granted to the 
LDCs, while the mfn clause would not apply and no 
reciprocity from their part was expected. The original 
idea was to have one generalized system of 
preferences of all developed countries for all developing 
countries. It did not come about that way. On the 
contrary, a number of preferential systems were 
initiated by individual DCs or groups of DCs, such as the 
EC, during thefirst half of the seventies. Although these 
systems had the same purpose their workings differed 
in many details, which we need not go into here. 5 Suffice 
4 This is not the place to judge whether-this i  a correct position. The 
developing countries probably contribute in only a minor way to the 
present problems of the rich countries. 
5 For a precise description, see e.g.T. M u r r a y : Trade Preferences 
for Developing Countries, London 1977; A. W e s t o n, V. C a b I e, 
A. H e w i t t : The EEC's Generalised System of Preferences, ODI, 
1980;orA. Borrmann, C. Borrmann, M. Stegger: Das 
AIIgemeine Zollpr&ferenzsystem derEG, Hamburg 1979. 
6 See e.g.T. M u r r a y : How Helpful i~ the Generalized System of 
Preferences to Developing Countries?, (n: Economic Journal, VoL 83, 
1973, pp. 449-455. 
7 UNCTAD TD/B/C.5/66, 20 February 1980 (prepared by T. Murray): 
Evaluation of the Trade Benefits under the United States Scheme of 
Generalized Preferences. 
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it to say that the original idea was somewhat watered 
down via the introduction of a great number of 
restrictions, e.g. tariff quotas, rules of origin, competitive 
need criteria, and so on. As a consequence many 
observers did not have great expectations of the 
preferences. 6
Because of this initial pessimism it is of some interest 
to quote the results of research by several authors into 
the effectiveness of the preferential systems. First, there 
is a study by UNCTAD on the effectiveness of the US 
scheme of preferences. 7This study tries to determine 
the main factors contributing to the growth of US 
imports from countries benefitting from its preferential 
scheme. One of the main results is that between 1974 
and 1977 some 65 % of the real growth in imports from 
the beneficiary countries can be attributed to the 
working of the US preferential scheme. Secondly, there 
is a study by Sapir concerning the effect of the EC 
system of preferences. 8 Sapir tries to determine, in a 
gravity type of trade model, whether there are any 
significant effects from the preferential system upon 
trade flows. He does find a significantly positive effect, 
especially for goods in SITC groups 7 and 8. In his 
words, "It does appear that the EEC GSP has expanded 
manufacturing exports from semi-industrialized nations 
in the few years after its inception". 9 Thirdly, there is 
another study on the EC preferential system which 
states, "There is thus clear evidence of the stimulatory 
effect of the GSP on trade".1~ This conclusion is drawn 
despite many criticisms by the authors with respect to 
the working of the system. 
Finally the results of a study by Baldwin and Murray 
are interesting. 1~ They compared the benefits of tariff 
reductions under the mfn clause with the GSP benefits, 
via the calculation of the amounts of trade creation and 
diversion following both types of concessions. They 
concluded that the LDCs, as a whole, stood to gain more 
from mfn tariff concessions than from the GSP 
schemes, in particular because of the many restrictions 
on the GSP schemes. This conclusion applied of course 
mainly to those countries being restricted by the rules of 
the GSP. Summarizing, one might say that in general 
developing countries benefit from preferential systems, 
but that these benefits are restricted because of the 
8 A. S a p i r : Trade Benefits under the EEC Generalized System of 
Preferences, in: European Economic Review, Vol. 25, 1981, pp. 339- 
355. 
9 A. Sapir, op. cit.,p. 352. 
lO A. Borrmann, C. Borrmann, M. Stegger: The 
Impact of the GSP on Imports, in: INTERECONOMICs No. 5, 1979, p. 
224. 
11 R. E. Baldwin, T. Murray: MFN Tariff Reduction and 
Developing Country Trade Benefits under the GSP, in: The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 87, March 1977, pp. 33-46. 
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many limitations of these systems. Thus preferential 
systems have, at least to some extent, served their 
purpose. Insofar as that is true, of course, it serves at the 
same time as a valid reason for the call for graduation. 
Newly Industrializing Countries 
Another, and more general, clear indication of the 
LDCs' success in exporting industrial products is the 
increasing concern with the newly industrializing 
countries (NICs). It is hard to give a precise definition of 
NICs. In the literature one may find some five, partly 
overlapping, groups of NICs distinguished. One may 
even doubt whether it is very useful to try to identify a 
certain group of countries as NICs. Anyway, the general 
idea is that NiCs are developing countries that have very 
quickly become successful exporters of industrial 
products. As such, many more developing countries 
than the ten or so usually considered have certain NIC 
aspects. 12 
This is not the place to go into a detailed explanation 
of the reasons behind the success of the NICs. 13 It will 
suffice here to give a brief summary of the factors to 
which the NICs' success is generally attributed. 
These are a combination of outward-looking growth 
policies and a number of individual factors. According to 
the product cycle theory/, a dynamic theory of 
international trade, new products, involving much R & D 
spending and highly skilled labour, are originally 
produced in the rich countries and exported to the poor. 
Later on, as the production process becomes 
standardized, R & D inputs and skilled labour inputs 
become less important and unskilled labour becomes 
more important. The availability of large amounts of 
cheap unskilled labour in developing countries therefore 
means that the comparative advantage in producing 
those formerly new products then shifts from the rich to 
the poor countries. This can apply not only to complete 
products, but also to parts of the production process. 
This shift in comparative advantage is facilitated by the 
involvement of multinationals, due to their knowledge of 
production conditions and international markets and 
their flexibility. Another factor in this process is the 
existence of offshore assembly provisions: when a 
product is exported, further processed, and re-imported, 
import duties are only applied to that part of the value of 
the product that has been created abroad and not to the 
~2 This is partly recognized in a recent OECD study: Development 
Cooperation, 1982 Review, OECD, Paris 1982, Ch. 12, dealing with 
"new" NICs. 
1~ See for a general discussion e.g. OECD, op. cit., or an older study by 
the OECD: The impact of the Newly Industrializing Countries on 
Production and Trade in Manufactures, OECD, Paris 1979. 
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total value of the imported product. This, of course, 
increases the attractiveness of processing abroad. 
Besides these general factors there are, of course, 
individual factors which also help to explain individual 
countries' performance, e.g. political factors, size of the 
home market, level of education of the labour force, etc. 
The conclusion from both the experience with the 
preferential schemes and the performance of the NlCs 
is the following. A number of developing countries have 
shown their ability to compete in world markets, both 
with and without preferences. From that point of view it is 
both reasonable and advantageous that they accept the 
implementation of the principle of graduation. It still 
remains to be seen, of course, whether there are other 
considerations which weigh in favour of, or against, the 
implementation of graduation. If, after considering the 
pros and cons, graduation would still seem 
advantageous, necessary or even unavoidable, there 
remains the crucial problem of the form of graduation 
and the criteria to be applied in deciding whether certain 
countries (or products) would qualify. 
The Price to Be Paid 
There are several other arguments in favour of 
graduation. Firstly, as graduating poor countries would 
diminish their own import barriers, rich as well as other 
poor countries would have more opportunity for 
exporting to these countries. On the basis of reciprocity 
this might induce rich countries to be less protectionist 
towards these same countries. On the other hand, it is of 
course doubtful whether other poor countries would 
really benefit in this way, as they would have to compete 
on an equal footing with the rich countries. Secondly, 
diminishing preferences for graduating countries in the 
rich countries' import markets would leave more room 
there for the poorer countries. But again they would 
have to compete for this extra room with the rich 
countries, albeit on the basis of preferences in this case. 
Thirdly, as graduation would help diminish distortions on 
both the import and export side of their economies, it 
would increase the welfare of these countries, in this 
case all the arguments of the export promotion versus 
import substitution debate do apply. 
The most general and compelling argument against 
graduation is of course related to the balance-of- 
payments shortages most poor countries are suffering. 
The question is posed whether poor countries can really 
afford graduation, which would probably, at least in the 
short run, worsen their balance-of-payments position. 
However, in so far as these shortages are caused by 
shortages in the energy trade balance they should not in 
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my opinion, be used as an argument against graduation 
as that problem will have to be solved mainly by 
appropriate nergy demand and supply policies, difficult 
as that may be. TM Another argument states that poor 
countries are only competitive in a small number of 
products. While probably rich countries are competitive 
in a greater range of products than poor countries, this 
range is, almost by definition, of course limited too. In 
general then this is not a valid argument, although one 
might think of extreme cases here, e.g. jute products 
from Bangla Desh. 
Altogether, to my mind, the arguments in favour of 
graduation do outweigh those against. The main 
disadvantage, a worsening balance-of-payments 
position, might be taken care of via the introduction of a 
temporary fund which would compensate countries for 
graduation-related balance-of-payments shortages. 
The specifics of this fund, although not unimportant, do 
not matter for the argument. Also, graduation would 
have to be country-wise, not product-wise, as is already 
implicitly stated above. And if a different weighting of the 
arguments above, or still other considerations, lead one 
to reject graduation, there still remains the political 
pressure from the rich countries to be taken into 
9 account, and graduation might then well be seen as the 
price to be paid to escape from, or at least diminish, 
protectionist measures from the rich countries against 
(some of) the poor countries. Either way one would need 
to have certain criteria according to which countries 
would be considered for application of graduation. 
Criteria for Competitiveness 
While in the end the process of choosing countries 
eligible for graduation may well be more of a political 
than of an economic nature, it is still worthwhile to 
consider some "objective" elements that might enter 
this process. The essence of graduation involves the 
increasing competitiveness of developing countries in 
international markets. Therefore any set of graduation 
criteria should include elements representing a 
country's (increase in) competitiveness, in particular in 
industrial products. In this connection, one may think of 
changes in market shares, either worldwide, or in 
particular regional markets. Another possibility 
concerns changes in the structure of industrial exports. 
A second consideration might be the level of 
development, e.g. measured by per capita income. In 
my opinion this should work not so much by excluding 
from graduation countries below some income level, as 
14 Energy trade balance shortages are likely to become less anyway 
due to the recent price weakening of oil. 
rather by making countries above that income level 
eligible, in principle, for graduation. 
A third, aspect might be sought in the factors 
determining competitiveness, instead of in the results of 
increasing competitiveness, as e.g. represented by 
increasing market shares. In this case one might think of 
the level of education of the labour force. 
Of course it is possible to think of still other, maybe 
more refined, criteria to be applied but that is likely to be 
a superfluous exercise, as graduation is probably going 
to be a matter of rough and ready criteria. 
An Inescapable Phenomenon 
It seems that graduation is an inescapable 
phenomenon, by definition in the long run, but also, for 
political and other reasons, probably in the short run. In 
that case it is more advantageous for developing 
countries to cooperate in finding a reasonable system of 
graduation, than to try to stern the tide. It may well be a 
matter of "graduate or be graduated", is 
In co-operating with the rich countries in the 
establishment of graduation rules, the poor countries 
may find an opportunity to attenuate the main external 
disadvantage of graduation, i.e. increased balance-of- 
payments problems, via e.g. a temporary fund as 
suggested above. Also, the rich countries may find this 
an opportunity to soften the blow of graduation by 
increasing preferences for the poorer developing 
countries. By doing so, they would show that their 
intention is not merely to decrease competition from the 
developing countries in general, but also to promote the 
interests of those developing countries that can clearly 
not yet compete in the international markets. 
Finally, it might be possible then to agree upon a 
reasonable time schedule for the implementation of 
graduation for the countries considered eligible. One 
might even distinguish several phases of graduation. 
First could come abolishment of preferences. The 
following step could consist of a more rigid application of 
some of the codes of conduct, agreed upon in the Tokyo 
Round, in particular that dealing with subsidies. The 
final phase would then consist of full application of all the 
codes as they apply for the developed country members 
of GATT right now. 
is According to the "Economisch Dagblad", April 6th, 1983, p. 9, 
William Brock, US trade representative, has stated that goods worth 2.6 
billion dollars have been taken out of the GSP of the US. This concerns 
in particular products coming from Taiwan, Mexico, Singapore, South 
Korea and Chile. On the other hand, goods worth 300 million dollars 
have been brought under the GSP. Among these products is sugar, US 
imports of which were worth 175 million dollars in 1982, benefitting 
Guatemala, Colombia, Argentina, the Philippines and Swaziland. 
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